Asma Jilani v. Punjab (1972) – End of Martial Law Doctrine
Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab – A Turning Point in Constitutional Law
Introduction
The Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139) stands as one of the most consequential constitutional cases in Pakistan’s legal history. This landmark judgment not only overturned the controversial precedent set in State v. Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533) but also reasserted the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, and the principle of judicial review over arbitrary military takeovers.
Through this judgment, the Supreme Court of Pakistan categorically rejected the applicability of Hans Kelsen's theory of legal positivism in validating unconstitutional regime changes under the guise of “revolution.” The case also addressed critical issues regarding the legality of Martial Law, the scope of the doctrine of necessity, and the constitutional obligations of the Armed Forces under their oath. This article provides a detailed legal analysis of the case, its background, implications, and long-lasting impact on constitutional jurisprudence in Pakistan..webp)
Case Citation & Historical Background
The case of Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139) is a landmark judgment in Pakistan's constitutional history. It was decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1972 and is formally cited as PLD 1972 SC 139. This case emerged in the aftermath of the unlawful detention of political figures during the military regime of General Yahya Khan. The judgment played a crucial role in restoring constitutional supremacy and rejecting the legal basis of martial law imposed after the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution. By overruling the earlier precedent set in the State v. Dosso case, the Supreme Court affirmed that military takeovers have no legitimacy under Pakistan’s constitutional framework.
Abrogation of Constitution: Rejection of Dosso and Kelsen’s Theory
Supreme Court Overrules State v. Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533)
In the landmark judgment of Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139), the Supreme Court of Pakistan categorically overruled the earlier precedent set in State v. Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533). The Court disapproved of the application of Hans Kelsen’s doctrine of legal positivism which had been previously relied upon in Dosso to legitimize unconstitutional takeovers of power.
“If a constitution and the national legal order under it is disrupted by an abrupt political change not contemplated by the constitution, such a change is termed a revolution. Its legal effect is the destruction of the existing constitution and the creation of a new legal order… If the new regime gains effective control, its legality is judged by its success, not by reference to the annulled constitution.” — *State v. Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533*
Kelsen’s Theory Rejected
The Supreme Court firmly rejected this line of reasoning. It held that the principle adopted in Dosso was neither acceptable on the basis of stare decisis nor valid under any consistent interpretation of constitutional law. The Court emphasized that martial law does not empower the military to abrogate the Constitution. The mere imposition of martial law cannot suspend civil governance or fundamental rights, nor can it authorize the commander of the armed forces to assume the role of a lawmaker.
“Martial Law does not by itself involve abrogation of civil law and functioning of civil authorities and certainly does not vest the commander of the Armed Forces with the power of abrogating the fundamental law of the country.”
Furthermore, the judgment clarified that Kelsen’s legal positivism is not a universally accepted doctrine. It lacks the normative structure necessary to guide constitutional interpretation and the daily application of law by judges or administrators. As such, it cannot serve as the legal basis for justifying the destruction or suspension of constitutional governance in Pakistan.
“The doctrine of legal positivism propounded by Hans Kelsen is not universally accepted, and it does not formulate any legal norm for the daily concern of judges, legal or administrators and therefore, cannot be made the basis of a decision of a Court of law.”
Case Approval: Mir Hassan v. The State (PLD 1969 Lah. 786)
The Court, instead of following Dosso, approved the decision in Mir Hassan v. The State (PLD 1969 Lahore 786, Full Bench). That case had already questioned the validity of applying revolutionary legality to constitutional disruption. The approval of this case further strengthened the Court's view that the Constitution of Pakistan stands above all arbitrary authority, and that the military is bound by its oath to defend, not destroy, the constitutional order.
“Applying the doctrine of "Legal positivism” propounded by Kelsen, it was held in Dosso that "a constitution and the National Legal Order under it is disrupted by an abrupt political change not within the contemplation of the constitution” then such a change "is called a revolution and its legal effect is not only the destruction of the existing constitution but also the validity of the national legal order", therefore, any change, no matter how or by whom brought about, whether by violence or nonviolent coup d'etat or even by a person already in a public position, is "in law a revolution if it annuls the constitution and the annulment is effective". If persons assuming power under such a change "can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then. the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact, because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled constitution but by reference to its own success". According to international law "a victorious revolution or a successful coup d'etat is an internationally recognized legal method of changing a constitution".
This principle is wholly unsustainable and cannot be treated as good law either on the principle of stare decisis or otherwise. Martial Law does not by itself involve abrogation of civil law and functioning of civil authorities, and certainly does not vest the commander of the Armed Forces with the power of abrogating the fundamental law of the country. Commander of the Armed Forces is bound by his oath to defend the Constitution. The doctrine of "legal positivism" propounded by Hans Kelsen is not universally accepted, and it does not formulate any legal norm for the daily concern of judges, legal or administrators, and therefore, cannot be made the basis of a decision of a Court of law.
Facts of the Case in Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139)
Arrest of Malik Ghulam Jilani under Defence of Pakistan Rules
The case originated with the arrest of Malik Ghulam Jilani, a senior political figure and the father of the appellant, Miss Asma Jilani. He was detained on 22 December 1971 under an order issued pursuant to Rule 32(1)(b) read with Rule 213 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971. A writ petition challenging the detention order was filed in the Lahore High Court, and the Government of Punjab was duly notified to appear on 31 December 1971.
Substitution of Detention Order under Martial Law Regulation No. 78
However, on 30 December 1971, just one day before the scheduled hearing, the Government revoked the initial detention order and issued a fresh one under Martial Law Regulation No. 78, issued by the Martial Law Administrator of Zone "C". In response, the petitioner amended the writ petition to challenge the new detention order.
Government's Preliminary Objection and High Court's Decision
During the hearing on 15 January 1972, the Government raised a preliminary objection, asserting that the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted under Clause 2 of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order, 1969, which had been promulgated by the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The Lahore High Court, relying on the precedent set in State v. Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533), accepted the objection. Justice Shafi-ur-Rehman held that the Order was valid and binding, and as such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the petition.
Parallel Detention of Altaf Hussain Gauhar
In a parallel case, a writ petition was filed in the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan challenging the detention of Mr. Altaf Hussain Gauhar under Martial Law Order No. 78, issued by the Martial Law Administrator of Zone "D". The High Court dismissed the petition, relying on the same reasoning adopted in the Lahore case—primarily based on the validity of Martial Law regulations and the Dosso judgment.
Supreme Court’s Final Ruling: Detentions Declared Illegal
Both cases were eventually appealed to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Court consolidated the appeals and delivered a landmark judgment, declaring that “both the impugned orders of detention [were] void and without legal effect”. The Supreme Court overruled State v. Dosso, held that Martial Law authorities had no constitutional authority to detain civilians under such orders, and ordered the immediate release of both detenus.
Legal Issues Before the Supreme Court in Asma Jilani Case
Jurisdiction of High Courts Under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution
One of the core legal questions addressed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139) was whether the High Courts retained jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, to examine the legality of detentions made under Martial Law Regulation No. 78 of 1971. The Government had invoked the Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order, 1969—a Martial Law Order—to argue that such jurisdiction had been expressly ousted.
Validity of the Dosso Doctrine and Legal Recognition of Military Coups
Another critical issue before the Court was whether the doctrine laid down in the controversial case of State v. Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533) remained valid law. In that decision, the Court had accepted the Kelsenian doctrine of legal positivism, holding that a successful revolution—such as a military coup—automatically creates a new legal order, regardless of its unconstitutionality.
As Chief Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman noted, the question was whether such successive usurpations of power, merely because of their effectiveness, could continue to receive judicial recognition as lawful. The Court was thus faced with the larger constitutional question: Can military takeovers and extra-constitutional regimes ever receive legal legitimacy under Pakistan’s constitutional framework?
Restoring Constitutional Supremacy and the Rule of Law
By revisiting the Dosso precedent, the Supreme Court examined whether the judiciary should continue to legitimize unconstitutional actions under the guise of effectiveness. The case demanded a fundamental reevaluation of how Pakistan's legal system defines sovereignty, legality, and constitutional continuity. The Court’s eventual rejection of the Dosso doctrine marked a significant shift toward reestablishing judicial independence and constitutional supremacy.
Judgment of the Supreme Court
Held that in laying down a novel juristic principle of such far-reaching importance, the Chief Justice in the case of State v. Dosso proceeded on the basis of certain assumptions, namely:
- (1) That the basic doctrines of legal positivism, which he was accepting, were such firmly and universally accepted doctrines that “the whole science of modern jurisprudence” rested upon them;
- 2) That any abrupt political change not within the contemplation of the Constitution constitutes a revolution, no matter how temporary a transitory the change, if no one has taken any step to oppose it; and
- 3) That the rule of international law with regard to the recognition of a State can also determine the validity of the State's internal sovereignty.
"These assumptions were not justified. Kelsen’s theory was, by no means, universally accepted theory nor was it a theory which could claim to have become a basic doctrine of the science of modern jurisprudence, nor did Kelsen even attempts to formulate any theory which “favours totalitarianism)”. Kelsen was only trying to lay down a pure theory of law as a rule of normative science consisting of “‘an aggregate or system or norms”, He was propounding a theory of law as a, “mere jurists or system or norms”.
He was propounding a theory of law as a “mere jurists” proposition about law. He was not attempting to lay down any legal norm or legal norms which are “the daily concerns of judges, legal practitioners or administrators”.
Kelsen, in his attempt to evolve a pure science of law as distinguished from a natural science, attached the greatest importance to keeping law and might apart. He did not lay down the proposition that the command of the person in authority is a source of law. Kelsen’s attempt to justify the principle of effectiveness from the standpoint of international law cannot also be justified, for it assumes “the primacy of international law over national law”.
In doing so he has overlooked that for the purposes of international law, and legal person is the state and not the community, and that in international law, there is no “legal order” as such. The recognition of a state under international law has nothing to do with the internal sovereignty of the state, and this kind of recognition of a state must not be confused with the recognition of the head of a state through the recognition of other states, but through the municipal law of his own state.
The question of recognition of a government from the point of view of international law becomes important only when a change in the form of government also involves a break in the legal continuity of the state, or where the question arises as to whether the new government has a reasonable expectancy of permanence so as to be able to claim the representative of the state.
Chief Justice’s Analysis of Kelsen’s Legal Positivism
Critique of Kelsen's Theory in the Context of Pakistani Constitutional Law
Chief Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman, in the landmark judgment of Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139), offered a comprehensive critique of the doctrine of legal positivism as propounded by Hans Kelsen. The theory had been adopted earlier by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir in the controversial State v. Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533), which legitimized extra-constitutional regimes on the basis of revolutionary success.
Key Reasons for Rejecting Kelsen’s Positivism
According to Chief Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman, the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s doctrine were fundamentally flawed and not suitable for application within Pakistan’s constitutional framework. The Court outlined several critical reasons for its rejection:
- Lack of Universal Acceptance: Kelsen’s theory is not universally accepted in modern jurisprudence and cannot be considered a definitive legal standard.
- Not a Foundational Principle: It is not the core doctrine of contemporary legal systems or constitutional democracies.
- Normative Structure Only: Kelsen’s theory describes law as a “pure theory”—a system of hierarchical norms—not as a guide for practical governance or adjudication.
- No Operational Value for Judges: It provides no concrete legal norms to address the daily responsibilities of judges, lawyers, or legal administrators.
- Does Not Justify Power-Based Legality: The theory does not support the idea that mere effectiveness or control by a person in power makes their actions legally valid.
Limitations of Kelsen's Theory Under International Law
The Court further rejected the notion that international law supports the principle of “effectiveness” in justifying unconstitutional regimes. It emphasized:
- Primacy Not Presumed: International law does not presume superiority over national constitutional orders.
- Lack of Unified Legal Order: There is no coherent, enforceable international legal system that could validate internal coups or revolutions.
- Recognition ≠ Legitimacy: Recognition of a state or regime under international law has no bearing on its internal sovereignty or legal validity under its domestic constitution.
Judicial Independence Over Theories of Power
The Supreme Court firmly held that legitimacy in law must derive from the Constitution, not from success in seizing power. The rejection of Kelsen’s legal positivism was pivotal in restoring the judiciary’s commitment to the rule of law, constitutional continuity, and democratic principles.
Observations of the Chief Justice in Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab
International Law and the Dosso Judgment
The observations of the Chief Justice in Dosso’s case are not covered upon the principles of international law. If the territory and the people remain substantially the same, there is no change in the corpus or international entity of the state, and the revolutionary government and the new state are, according to international law, the legitimate government and the valid constituents of the state. This proposition does not find support from any principle of international law.
According to Oppenheim’s View on Recognition of States
According to Oppenheim’s view as propounded in his book on international law:
If the revolutionary government is ineffective and/or has no “reasonable expectancy of permanence” and/or does not “enjoy the acquiescence of the population,” then the international community may well refuse to recognize it, even though its territorial integrity remains unchanged and its people remain substantially the same. The basic idea, therefore, is true that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court not only misapplied the doctrine of Hans Kelsen, but also fell into error in thinking that it was a generally accepted doctrine of modern jurisprudence. Even the disciples of Kelsen have hesitated to go as far as Kelsen had gone.
The Concept of Grundnorm and Pakistan’s Constitutional Foundations
In any event, if a grundnorm is necessary, Pakistan need not have to look to the Western legal theorists to discuss it. Pakistan’s own grundnorm is enshrined in its own doctrine that the legal sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the authority exercisable by the people within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust. This is an immutable and unalterable norm which was clearly accepted in the Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on the 7th of March, 1949. This has not been abrogated by anyone so far, nor has this been deviated from by any regime, military or civil. Indeed, it cannot be, for it is one of the fundamental principles enshrined in the Holy Quran.
Basic Concept of Sovereignty in Islamic Constitutional Thought
The basic concept underlying this unalterable principle of sovereignty is that the entire body politic becomes a trustee for the discharge of sovereign functions. Since in a complex society every citizen cannot personally participate in the performance of the trust, the body politic appoints state functionaries to discharge these functions on its behalf and for its benefit, and has the right to remove the functionary so appointed by it if he goes against the law of the legal sovereign, or commits any other breach of trust or fails to discharge his obligations under a trust.
The functional head of the state is chosen by the community and has to be assisted by a council which must hold its meetings in public view and remain accountable to the public. It is under this system that the government becomes a government of laws and not of men, for no one is above the law.
Rejection of Dosso as Precedent
It was therefore held that the principle enunciated in Dosso is wholly unsustainable, and it cannot be treated as good law either on the basis of stare decisis or otherwise.
Legal Analysis of the 1969 Military Takeover in Pakistan
Context: Ayub Khan’s Resignation and the Role of the Armed Forces
On 24th March 1969, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, then President of Pakistan, addressed a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. In this letter, he expressed deep regret at having to conclude that the civil administration and constitutional machinery in the country had become “ineffective.” After summarizing the deteriorating political and administrative conditions, he acknowledged that the civil government was incapable of handling the escalating crisis and therefore urged the armed forces to intervene and restore order.
Ayub Khan stated that there was no alternative left for him but to step aside and entrust full control of the nation’s affairs to the defense forces, which he regarded as the only effective and lawful authority remaining. However, it is crucial to note that his communication made no mention of formally appointing General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan as his constitutional successor, nor did it grant him any authority to abrogate the 1962 Constitution. The same sentiment was echoed during a national broadcast at 7:15 PM on 25th March 1969.
Absence of Constitutional Succession or Martial Law Proclamation
Neither the resignation letter nor the radio broadcast suggested that Ayub Khan had constitutionally handed over power or declared Martial Law. The communications merely invited the army to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty and internal peace — functions legally limited to defense against external aggression and internal emergencies. The constitutional procedure for resignation, as laid out in Article 12 of the 1962 Constitution, required the President to tender his resignation in writing to the Speaker of the National Assembly. Upon the resignation, Article 16 required the Speaker to assume the role of Acting President, and fresh presidential elections were to be conducted within 90 days.
Unconstitutional Assumption of Power by General Yahya Khan
Despite these constitutional mandates, on 25th March 1969, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan unilaterally proclaimed Martial Law across Pakistan. He assumed the title of Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), abrogated the 1962 Constitution, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, and dismissed all executive officeholders, including ministers, governors, and council members. Although the judiciary and existing laws were allowed to remain temporarily intact, a prohibition was imposed against issuing any writs or orders against the CMLA or his appointees.
Constitutional Limitations and Lack of Authority
The 1962 Constitution did not confer upon President Ayub Khan any power to delegate or transfer executive authority to a military official. While Article 30 allowed the President to declare an emergency in the event of internal disorder, and arguably, even to proclaim Martial Law under extreme circumstances, no provision permitted a military commander to declare Martial Law independently. Additionally, Article 16 strictly provided for the constitutional succession mechanism upon presidential resignation — a process that was entirely bypassed in this instance.
Martial Law Proclamation Lacked Legal Validity
The takeover by General Yahya Khan was thus outside the constitutional framework and cannot be deemed legally valid. The events of March 1969 represent a clear deviation from Pakistan’s constitutional order, with the military assuming authority without lawful delegation or due process. This analysis underscores the importance of adhering to constitutional procedures in times of political crisis and reinforces the legal principle that no authority, military or otherwise, is above the Constitution.
Martial Law in Constitutional and International Legal Context
Definition and Evolution of Martial Law
The term Martial Law has acquired multiple interpretations in modern legal discourse, particularly in constitutional law and international humanitarian law. In the United Kingdom, Martial Law in its traditional sense now primarily refers to the internal legal framework governing discipline within the armed forces. This area, commonly known as military law, is governed by legislative enactments such as the Army Act, Navy Act, and Air Force Act, all of which derive authority from statutes passed by the civil legislature.
Martial Law in International Armed Conflict
In the domain of international law, Martial Law refers to the powers exercised by a military commander in enemy-occupied territory during armed conflict, forming part of the jus belli. As famously described by the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords, Martial Law in this sense is “neither more nor less than the will of the General who commands the Army.” This formulation illustrates the discretionary authority of military leadership in wartime, distinct from any domestic legal order.
Types of Martial Law and Their Legal Implications
Domestic Martial Law and the Role of Civil Government
It is critical to differentiate between Martial Law invoked internally to restore public order and Martial Law implemented as an occupying force in foreign territory. Domestic Martial Law is typically imposed via a civil proclamation under governmental authority and is only justified when the civil courts and executive machinery have become non-functional due to extreme disorder. The mere declaration of Martial Law does not automatically suspend the functioning of the judiciary or civil administration, nor does it override the supremacy of the Constitution.
Martial Law vs. Civil Authority: Jurisdictional Boundaries
Under constitutional principles and common law, the legality of Martial Law is always subject to judicial review. Courts have consistently asserted their authority to determine whether the exigency justifying Martial Law exists. The maxim inter arma silent leges — "in times of war, the law is silent" — has limited application in domestic governance. Where civil courts are operational and capable of functioning, the imposition of Martial Law is legally indefensible.
Judicial Perspective on Martial Law in Pakistan
Limits of Military Power Under the Constitution
An analysis of case law and constitutional doctrine leads to the conclusion that a proclamation of Martial Law does not inherently authorize the abrogation of civil law, nor does it empower military authorities to dismantle the fundamental legal order. Such a view undermines the core constitutional mandate that the armed forces are subordinate to the law and exist solely to defend the state, not to dismantle it. If Martial Law were to legally erase the Constitution, the military would effectively be disrupting the legal order it is sworn to protect, a contradiction that nullifies the legitimacy of such an action.
Martial Law under General Yahya Khan: An Unconstitutional Act
In the landmark case of Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139), the Supreme Court of Pakistan categorically held that the imposition of Martial Law by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was unconstitutional and devoid of lawful authority. Presidential Order No. 3 of 1969, which sought to curtail the jurisdiction of superior courts, was struck down as invalid. Additionally, Martial Law Regulation No. 78, which empowered the executive to detain individuals indefinitely without due process, was declared illegal, illegitimate, and unsustainable, even under the doctrine of state necessity.
Reaffirmation of Judicial Supremacy and Fundamental Rights
The Supreme Court’s ruling reaffirmed that fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution cannot be suspended or nullified by arbitrary military actions. The judgment marked a pivotal moment in Pakistan’s constitutional history, clearly establishing that military authority is subject to constitutional limitations and judicial scrutiny.
Martial Law Cannot Supersede Constitutional Sovereignty
Martial Law, when invoked internally, must always operate within the confines of constitutional authority. The enforcement of order must not come at the expense of civil liberties, judicial independence, and democratic governance. The judiciary remains the final arbiter in determining the legality of Martial Law and has rightly held that no authority, including the armed forces, may abrogate the Constitution under the guise of emergency powers.
Conclusion: Rejection of Dosso and Restoration of Constitutional Supremacy
The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in a landmark reaffirmation of the supremacy of the Constitution, unequivocally overruled the precedent set in the State v. Dosso case. The Court categorically rejected the flawed doctrine that an unconstitutional regime change could attain legal validity merely on the basis of political effectiveness or revolutionary success. It held that such a doctrine, rooted in Hans Kelsen’s theory of legal positivism, is wholly incompatible with the principles of a constitutional democracy and cannot be treated as sound law, neither under the doctrine of stare decisis nor under any other legal justification.
In its authoritative judgment in Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139), the Court further clarified that the imposition of Martial Law does not, in itself, result in the abrogation of civil law or the suspension of judicial or governmental institutions. The mere declaration of Martial Law cannot and does not confer upon the Commander-in-Chief or any military authority the power to override the Constitution of Pakistan. On the contrary, every member of the Armed Forces is constitutionally bound, by solemn oath, to uphold, protect, and defend the Constitution, not dismantle it.
This landmark verdict reestablished the principle that constitutional sovereignty cannot be usurped by military authority, and that the rule of law must prevail over the doctrine of necessity. It served as a pivotal moment in Pakistan’s legal history, restoring faith in the independence of the judiciary and the supremacy of civilian constitutional order. In doing so, the Court protected the sanctity of fundamental rights, rejected arbitrary rule, and decisively reinforced the idea that no authority, civil or military, is above the Constitution.
Last updated on August 5, 2025
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is the significance of Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab?
The case is significant because it overruled the Dosso judgment, declared Martial Law imposed by General Yahya Khan as unconstitutional, and reaffirmed the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law in Pakistan.
Did the Supreme Court accept Hans Kelsen’s theory in this case?
No, the Supreme Court rejected Hans Kelsen's legal positivist theory as a basis for validating unconstitutional regimes, stating that it was neither universally accepted nor suitable for Pakistan’s constitutional framework.
What was the legal status of Martial Law under the 1972 judgment?
The Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of Martial Law by General Yahya Khan was illegal and that Martial Law does not automatically abrogate civil law or empower the military to suspend the Constitution.
Which precedent was overruled by Asma Jilani case?
The Asma Jilani case overruled the precedent set in State v. Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533), which had previously legitimized unconstitutional changes in government through the doctrine of revolutionary legality.
Why is the Asma Jilani case important in Pakistan’s constitutional development?
It restored the judiciary's independence, reaffirmed the constitutional limitations on military authority, and established that no institution is above the Constitution, laying a strong foundation for democratic governance in Pakistan.